Informed Consent and the Patients of Bangladesh by Md. Munir Hossain Talukder
19
JAHR  Vol. 7/1  No. 13  2016
UDK 608.1:61(59)
Review Article / Pregledni članak
Received / Zaprimljen: 21. 12. 2015.
Md. Munir Hossain Talukder1*
Informed Consent and the Patients of 
Bangladesh
ABSTRACT
In medical practice, informed consent plays a vital role in making ethical decisions. In recent 
years, informed consent also appears to be a key issue in biomedical discussion. Several 
definitions of informed consent have already been proposed. However, the socio-economic 
conditions of different countries are not the same. Many countries differ culturally as well 
as in literacy rate. Therefore, a unified concept of informed consent might not be justified 
in every context. This paper discusses the importance of informed consent, different views 
regarding informed consent and the limitations of applying one single idea of informed 
consent in every context. It argues that the most plausible concept of informed consent which 
is achievable for developing countries, like Bangladesh, is based on care ethics. The paper 
concludes that informed consent could be a ‘natural outcome’ and is really not a barrier in the 
patient-physician relationship if the idea is seen from the perspective of care ethics.
Keywords: autonomy, care ethics, informed consent, patient-physician relation, respect, risk.
1. Introduction
Informed consent is a core component of treatment decisions. It also expresses 
quite explicit the patient-physician relationship. Different ethicists propose different 
conceptions of informed consent. Some of them, e.g. Faden, Beauchamp and 
Childress’s conceptions, are used widely in the biomedical issues, though their 
conceptions have been criticized by O’Neill, and care ethicists such as Dodds, 
Mackenzie and Stoljar. In this paper, we will discuss the importance of informed 
consent, different views regarding informed consent and its limitations. Then we will 
examine which conception is possible to gain in Bangladesh context. It seems strange 
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that there is a tendency to use one dominant concept of informed consent in many 
and different contexts. We will carefully examine this trend. At the end of the paper, 
the idea of relational autonomy will be justified in Bangladesh perspective.
2.   Why is informed consent important in the patient-physician 
relationship?
Informed consent is a world-wide well-known medical or ethical notion. Informed 
consent is important because it has a legal urge, and many health laws have included 
this conception as a vital clause. Secondly, almost all medical codes and guidelines 
have incorporated this requirement in order to protect the patient or the human 
subject from harm. In the patient-physician relationship informed consent procedure 
is valuable for the treatment. By informed consent procedure the competent patient’s 
voluntariness is protected. The practice and requirements of informed consent ensure 
the patient’s autonomy to decide for treatment and limit medical paternalism. 
Capron has indicated two basic justifications of informed consent: the first one, 
“protection from harm” and the second, “protection of autonomy” (Beauchamp and 
Childress 1983, 67). 
Any medical intervention or clinical research has to fulfil the crucial requirement of 
informed consent to be considered as ethical. Medical treatment may involve risk, 
and benefit as well. Before starting a treatment the physician has an obligation to 
inform the patient about underlying risks and probable benefit. Informed consent 
might serve as a way of providing information about the treatment. Sometimes 
informed consent procedures may help the patient to decide in favour of between 
alternative diagnostic or medical intervention. 
According to Childress, informed consent gives the physician a special right and 
the patient transfers this right to the physician. He writes, “Consent is one possible 
ground for special rights that are created, or transferred, by transactions between 
parties. These rights are special because they depend on relationships....” (Childress 
1982, 79).
Therefore, informed consent is not only an “approval” but also a contract exercising 
some special “rights”. Another importance of informed consent is that it is a legal 
document and can be used for judicial purpose. As Schermer writes, “The doctrine 
of informed consent, however, is not only...a product of medical ethics. It developed 
within the framework of law and medical practice... and is directed by legal and 
practical considerations” (Schermer 2001, 40).
21
Md. Munir Hossain Talukder: Informed Consent and the Patients of Bangladesh  pp. 19–32
Schermer has pointed out the importance of four points about informed consent. 
First, informed consent is a “means” of gaining patient’s autonomy. Second, it could 
be an “expression” of respecting patient’s autonomy. Third, informed consent is a 
“promoter” of the well-being of the patient. Finally, it supports “rationality” and 
“self-determination” (Schermer 2001, 40-41).
Therefore, we may conclude that informed consent is important for protecting a 
patient’s autonomy, promoting patient’s rationality and self-choice, providing 
treatment information and guarding legally as well as ethically from coercion. 
3.  Different concept of informed consent
There is an ongoing debate about the meaning and procedure of informed consent. 
Some ethicists (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress) argue that informed consent protects 
the patient’s autonomy and respect for persons. Others (e.g. O’Neill) hold that 
informed consent prevents us from coercion whereas genuine informed consent 
is impossible to gain. Recently, care ethicists argue that the traditional conception 
of informed consent and autonomy are too individualistic. In this section, we will 
first explain different concepts of informed consent and their limitation. In the next 
section, we will then examine these conceptions in current Bangladesh context.
I. Faden, Beauchamp and Childress: Faden and Beauchamp, in their book A History 
and Theory of Informed Consent (1986) develop the notion of informed consent as 
an ethical and legal principle. In addition, they have presented the “conceptual” 
foundation of informed consent as an “ethical requirement”. Faden and Beauchamp 
separate two senses of informed consent. In the first sense, informed consent is an 
“action” by which a patient or subject declares his or her “autonomous authorisation” 
while in the second sense, informed consent is an institutional or legal “effective 
procedure” rather than autonomous authorisation. The goal of informed consent in 
the former sense is to fulfill moral requirement whereas in the later sense to satisfy 
legal or institutional requisite (Schermer 2001, 41).
Faden and Beauchamp hold that an autonomous action has to satisfy three basic 
criteria: “1.intentionality, 2.with understanding, and 3.without controlling 
influences” (Schermer 2001, p.42). Intentionally means willing as a conscious agent. 
An autonomous patient will perform an action willingly as well as consciously. 
Actions that happen accidentally or suddenly may not be considered as an intentional 
action. Some authors (e.g. Schremer) hesitate to accept intentionality as necessary 
for informed consent. Since when we give our consent it implies that we do so 
intentionally (Schermer 2001, 43). 
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Second, understanding refers that “...a patient must understand both the fact that 
he is giving an authorisation as well as all the material information pertaining to the 
treatment or procedure he is authorising”(Schermer 2001, 43). The importance of 
understanding is that the patient has to realize he or she is allowing authoritatively 
the intervention. The third criterion is about the voluntariness. Voluntariness ensures 
that the action has been performed without any influence or coercion (Schermer, 
2001, 46).
According to Beauchamp and Childress, the three basic components of competence 
are: “capacity to understand”, “deliberate” and “decide” (Beauchamp and Childress 
2001, p.72). They write, “...a person is usually considered competent if able to 
understand a therapeutic or research procedure, to deliberate regarding its major 
risks and benefits, and to make a decision in light of this deliberation” (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2001, 72).
The authors hold that competence and autonomy are closely related. An autonomous 
person is competent and able to give his or her consent. An autonomous person 
should have the capacity of making decision, understanding the (material) facts about 
the treatment procedure and use the information to make his or her own judgment. 
The disclosure refers to an obligation of the physician while understanding refers to an 
obligation of the patient. Disclosure is a legalistic procedure which involves necessary 
information. Beauchamp and Childress write, “Disclosure, like treatment, is a task 
that belongs to physicians because of their professional expertise and commitment to 
the patient’s welfare” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, 82).
Understanding is reasoning, communicating for authorising a treatment. It is associated 
with the patient’s knowledge, reasoning ability and projection. Understanding 
includes the ability to analyze, use and evaluate information regarding treatment. 
The minimum requirement for understanding is, “Patients...should understand at 
least what a health care professional...believes a patient...needs to understand in 
order to authorize an intervention. Diagnoses, prognoses, the nature and purpose of 
the intervention, alternatives, risks and benefits, and recommendations are typically 
essential” (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, 88-89).
Finally, the voluntariness implies absence of others’ influence. Voluntariness could 
have two senses as Beauchamp and Childress mention, one is narrow and the other 
is broad. In a broad sense voluntariness has a similar meaning to autonomy while in 
a narrow sense voluntariness is controlling any influence. Beauchamp and Childress 
state, “...a person acts voluntarily to the degree that he or she wills the action without 
being under the control of another’s influence” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, 
93).
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Although Faden, Beauchamp and Childress present a systematic and standard 
analysis of informed consent their views have been criticized strongly by some 
authors. O’Neill, Dodds, Mackenzie, Stoljar are prominent of them. We will analyze 
their views.
II. O’Neill: O’Neill argues that present framework and procedure of gaining informed 
consent is misleading. The authors who claim that informed consent requirement is 
sufficient to protect patient’s autonomy are over demanding. In many cases informed 
consent is not possible to obtain. She holds that informed consent conception has 
significant limitations. We should incorporate as well as relax some constraint of 
informed consent. Although she is doubtful about the necessity of formal practice 
of informed consent in the medical practice, she does not reject its strength. Yet, 
she argues that the consent conception needs to redesign. She writes, “Given that 
informed consent is problematic for so many patients, it can hardly be necessary for 
medical treatment” (O’Neill 2002, 40).
According to O’Neill, informed consent is meaningful only when both parties 
participate “willingly” and they are “aware” about the main theme of the consent. 
They should have a clear idea about how the contract will work. O’Neill says that 
informed consent creates greater “difficulty” in medicine than in its usual use in daily 
life. She identifies four limitations in the informed consent requirement. (O’Neill 
2003, 4-5). Firstly, incompetent people cannot give their consent. She writes, “We 
cannot give informed consent when we are very young or very ill, mentally impaired, 
demented or unconscious, or merely frail or confused” (O’Neill 2003, 4).
Secondly, informed consent is incompatible with constructing a unified public health 
policy. Since public policy is a unified conception and it is not possible to set a policy 
by taking consent from each and every person.
Thirdly, the patient has to disclose related family and genealogical information 
without obtaining consent from family members. Fourth, people such as “vulnerable”, 
“prisoners” are unable to “refuse” when they are being asked to give consent.
 According to O’Neill, consent should be simple as much as possible. Consent form 
should obviously not be “overwhelmed” by the information. Some patients want 
only basic information while others want more. So, the patient will choose how 
much information he or she needs to give consent (O’Neill 2003, 6). She states, “This 
balance can perhaps be achieved by giving them a limited amount of accurate and 
relevant information and providing user friendly ways for them...” (O’Neill 2003, 6)
III. Care ethics: Further, care ethicists have also criticized the traditional approach. 
Dodds identifies some limitations of autonomy-based informed consent practice. 
Firstly, giving the physician a responsibility to gain informed consent by providing 
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information is an “overturn” of paternalism. Since the physician is the only person 
who holds the power to give adequate information and the possible treatment. It 
is no more than paternalism except disclosing some information. Secondly, by the 
informed consent requirement bioethics isolated the conception of autonomy from 
its greater circumstances. As the notion of free speech which is isolated and protected 
by law from the social customs and practices. Only protecting the free speech without 
protecting freedom, or social customs is like protecting head without protecting the 
body. Thirdly, isolating informed consent implies that the physician’s ethical concern 
is only to obtain the patient’s consent and not to participate into the decision-
making process. That is, there are some vital issue between providing information 
and gaining consent such as how does the physician present the information to the 
patient, in what language, these issues are ignored (Dodds 2000, 213-214). 
According to care ethicists (like Dodds), the traditional concept of informed consent 
is too individualistic. Since this conception ignores the patient’s social bonding and 
inner power of relationship. The patient who is supposed to give consent is not out 
of the context. She is a small part of the whole society. Traditional informed consent 
does not truly reflect the patient’s values, thought or perception about the treatment. 
At best informed consent could be merely a choice (Dodds 2000, 216-217). 
Feminist bioethics proposes three constituents or procedures, namely “choice”, 
“control” and “care”, to develop an alternative theory of autonomy and informed 
consent as well. A choice will not be made separately rather the physician will listen 
the patient’s desire, whishes, and provide the information that they would like to 
have. The physician will help to decide. Control means that, for example, especially 
the women have the choice to control her reproductive capability. Care implies a 
caring relationship in an interconnected socio-cultural context. Hence, the feminist 
conception about autonomy and informed consent is that these are not isolated 
individual choices but rather a caring interrelationship among the patient, physician, 
society and culture (Dodds 2000, 218-222).
So, in a care ethics approach informed consent is not just a formal document or 
protector of autonomy. Informed consent is more than that, where the physician 
will help the patient to understand sympathetically, empathetically and feel what 
information will be necessary for the patient’s consent. In this approach informed 
consent could be an outcome of empathetic relationship contrary to a contract. As 
Rosenberg and Towars write, “The relationship should be reshaped...patient care that 
combines the biomedical analysis of disease with an empathic understanding of the 
patient’s illness experience. Truly informed consent is viewed as a natural outcome 
of the application of this more comprehensive framework” (Rosenberg and Towar 
1986, 181).
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As we have seen the traditional conception of autonomy-based informed consent 
is too individualistic and problematic. Therefore, the care ethicists propose a richer 
conception of autonomy where the self is embedded as well as differentiated. This 
new conception of autonomy is shaped as “relational autonomy” which gives more 
value to the interconnectedness, dependent relationships, and some human qualities 
like love, care, empathy, sympathy and so forth. Mackenzie and Stoljar define 
“relational autonomy” as,
“The term “relational autonomy”... is rather an umbrella term, designating a range 
related perspectives...a shared conviction, the conviction that persons are socially 
embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social 
relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as 
race, class, gender, and ethnicity” (Mackenzie and Stolzar 2000, 4).
Some basic characteristics of relational autonomy are: firstly, relational autonomy 
is a complete idea, i.e. it requires a holistic approach. Individuals are not isolated 
from the circumstances. Individuals and the society are internally related. It is 
shared conception between individuals, society and culture. So, we should treat the 
person as a “socially embedded” individual. The individual will not be identified as a 
rootless separate member, rather a deep rooted “social relationship” will identify the 
individual. So, the main claim of relational autonomy is that the agent can protect 
his or her autonomy within the social context, social relationship with others. It is 
difficult for the agent to be isolated from every social identity.
Secondly, relational autonomy is against all sorts of oppression and could be defined 
as an identifier of “agent’s social location”. As Mcleod and Sherwin say relational 
autonomy could be “...defined and pursued in a social context and that social 
context significantly influences the opportunities an agent has to develop or express 
autonomy skills” (McLeod and Sherwin 2000, 259-260).
Thirdly, relational autonomy is a “capability” of functioning as a “well-being of 
person”. As Brison says that relational autonomy,“...is one kind of relational account 
of autonomy that holds that an agent’s autonomy is dependent on her having an 
adequate capability to function...” (Brison 2000, 282-283).
 
4.   Which conception of informed consent is possible to gain in 
Bangladesh?
In Bangladesh, the current scenario of getting and respecting informed consent is 
painful. One of the major areas where informed consent plays a crucial role is patient-
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physician relationship. Unfortunately, in most cases exists an unhealthy relationship 
between patient and physician in Bangladesh. Elsewhere I have discussed the patient-
physician relationship in Bangladesh context in detail and argued that “As a result, 
the patient-physician relationship turns out to be very paternalistic. However, in a 
situation where people are vulnerable (economically, physically, and emotionally), 
that would instead require care with sympathy, communication, active and proper 
treatment, sufficient health information, and so on; this can rarely be found in 
healthcare practices in Bangladesh” (Talukder 2011, 68). I conclude that an alternative 
model, instead of the traditional one, which is committed to care and respects patient 
autonomy is more appropriate for Bangladesh. Recently, a context-sensitive patient-
physician relationship model in Bangladesh context has been outlined (Talukder 
2016). Patients do not enjoy the privilege of informed consent in Bangladesh. Many 
of these patients are poor and thus they do not get a chance to go to or visit doctors at 
District hospitals. Because of the several incapability (such as poor income, illiteracy, 
distance) they often go to either village doctors or to different notorious or unhealthy 
and unhygienic hospitals. However, it is often seen that in these hospitals the patients 
are poorly treated, medical staff is performing operations or suggesting medicines, 
physicians are inhospitable and uncooperative as they are burdened with many tasks 
and interests. They believe informed consent to be no more than a signature which 
will provide legal protection if the patient dies or harmed.
In district hospitals, when the patients, after long hours of waiting, finally get an 
appointment with the doctor and visit him or her, they find that the doctors are 
very busy. Sometimes it is seen that many doctors are reluctant to get informed 
consent, even if they are not busy. It seems that physicians wish to keep the patients 
in darkness and to keep these innocents in a frantic, agonizing and unethical state of 
worry and mental harassment by not explaining their health condition and available 
treatment. Sometimes patients are just told by the assistants that they have to take 
this specific treatment or operation. This mentally harasses the patient in the sense 
that he or she shall want to know why the doctor recommends this solution, what 
are the other possible solutions, what are the benefits of this treatment or operation 
over others, what are its risks and many other things. When the patient does not get 
the answer of these questions, he or she shall increasingly become suspicious and 
hypertensed, thus being harassed mentally. The main aim of this kind of physician is 
to earn black money through repeated visits in the private clinic or diagnostic centre 
where they are affiliated with and thus to get more payments. So, unfair business in 
spite of respecting patients autonomy takes place. Informed consent appears for these 
patients as a piece of paper where they are obliged to sign. 
However, business attitude among physicians may not be the only drawback in the 
informed consent practice. Insufficient knowledge and level of consciousness among 
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physicians about it is also vital. A study conducted on Bangladeshi physicians about 
their knowledge level of informed consent shows that “...although the majority of the 
physicians were conscious about informed consent, a large number of them did not 
possess sufficient knowledge about basic elements and fundamental characteristics of 
informed consent” (Hossain et al. 2005, 25). So, the study suggested “...to include 
more details of research ethics in the syllabus of undergraduate and postgraduate 
medical courses, particularly in developing countries” in priority basis (Ibid, 25). 
It implies that lack of a good number of ethics courses in the medical curriculum is 
another point to consider.
A good knowledge of ethics and updated medical Declarations will create confidence, 
higher responsibility and inspiration among physicians to successful communication 
with vulnerable patients. After conducting a research on pregnant women in rural 
Bangladesh and Sweden Lynöe et al. commented “The vulnerability of potential 
research subjects demands that researchers take seriously their responsibility to 
ensure the rights of the participants” (Lynöe et al. 2001, 461). The research shows 
that although illiteracy, poor income, miserable patient-physician ratio and so on 
prevail in the developing countries, the subjects can be vulnerable both in developed 
and developing countries. Only a caring and responsible physician or researcher can 
help to ensure an effective informed consent procedure.
Now, we could realize that some of the vital requirements of genuine informed 
consent are not possible to fulfill for an uneducated, poor patient. Although they have 
the capacity of making choice, some understanding about the treatment, these are 
not enough to give the consent. Moreover, in order to understand written disclosure 
they have to seek someone’s help primarily the physician’s. This sort of dependency 
might violate the criterion of voluntariness. Therefore, it might be impossible to gain 
genuine informed consent from the illiterate, poor patient of Bangladesh. O’Neill’s 
conception of informed consent seems more pragmatic in Bangladesh context 
than Faden, Beauchamp and Childress. Yet the question is: who will provide the 
information to the illiterate patient and how? The conception of informed consent 
as presented by care ethics seems more compatible in Bangladesh context. Since the 
poor and illiterate patient’s autonomy may not be viewed as individualistic. The 
health workers and the physician should gain informed consent in a more relational 
way. 
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5.   Justification of ‘relational autonomy’ (from care ethics 
perspective) in Bangladesh
Respecting patient’s autonomy and obtaining informed consent is a great challenge 
in developing countries like Bangladesh. The risk of exploitation is much higher 
here for several reasons. One way of protecting patient’s autonomy and their rights 
could be to consider community and family bonding, cultural embeddedness, social 
values, linguistic heritage, collaborative partnership, etc. Emanuel et al. argued that 
in developing countries the process of informed consent is complex and hence special 
concentration should be given to language, social traditions, and cultural and family 
practices. They suggested five benchmarks for obtaining informed consent. The second 
of these benchmarks says, “disclosure of information should be sensitive to the local 
context. It should be done using the local language, culturally appropriate idioms, 
and analogies that the prospective participants can understand. This obviously entails 
a need for collaborative partnership” (Emanuel et al. 2004, 934). The “partnership” 
among different parties including physician, patient, medical staffs, patient’s family 
members, researchers must be based, in my view, on a common value which is caring.
Campbell points out the same issue and argues that even though there are complexities 
and barriers to obtain informed consent in developing countries it cannot be a 
“myth”, rather it is a “reality”. However, making informed consent real in developing 
countries he suggested “Rather than assuming the inability of some people to grasp 
western biomedical concepts, researchers need to realize that understanding suffers in 
both developed and developing settings and that the real focus should be on adapting 
the universal paradigms of research to local cultural norms, ideas, and literacy levels” 
(Campbell 2013, 3). Therefore, it follows that we should consider western biomedical 
norms such as autonomy and informed consent in relation to local cultural and social 
values, socio-economic condition, literacy level and the level of understanding of 
common patients. 
Bhutta observes that in developing countries we should not just focus on a formal 
informed consent practice but rather look beyond it. One of the main roles of 
researchers or physicians in the wide conception of informed consent is being 
caring and compassionate. He writes, “This may only be possible in an environment 
where human rights are respected and the fundamental principles of justice govern 
the design and conduct of research. While the role of a caring and compassionate 
researcher is fundamental to conducting appropriate research in developing 
countries, the following permutations of the process and regulations may make it 
both easier and more ethical” (Bhutta 2004, 775). Bhutta’s permutations include the 
change of focus in informed consent, implementing innovative materials, alternative 
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way of documentation and involving senior community members. He suggested a 
partnership model for obtaining a true informed consent in developing countries, as 
he mentions here, “While ethics review committees can help in oversight, only an 
active and transparent partnership between research sponsors, investigators and the 
community can make this happen” (Ibid, 776). In a partnership model where caring 
as a means of transparency is the common value, obtaining informed consent will be 
seen more than a procedure. Only then we can see the informed consent an outcome 
of mutual respect, not just a procedure. 
The eminent physicians of Bangladesh also indicated a need for a partnership model 
that could be based on care ethics, as they themselves considered care giver and 
patients care seeker while recommending, “The civil society, the political parties, 
patients (care seekers), the doctor (care givers) community all have to play important 
role in this matter” (Islam and Jhora 2012, 55).
Therefore, we can assume that genuine informed consent may not be possible to gain 
in developing countries, including Bangladesh. We support care ethicists’ criticism 
against traditional autonomy and informed consent, and argue for a richer conception 
of autonomy specifically ‘relational autonomy’ from care ethics perspective.
The crucial question then appears: what is the advantage of the ‘relational autonomy’ 
conception? The main advantage is that relational autonomy considers patient’s 
rights as well as the physician’s obligation to care choice. It seems that to patients, 
autonomy and informed consent are secondary choice of patients and care is the first 
concern. Unlike paternalism, caring does not undermine the patient’s rights which 
are nourished through sympathy, care and relationship. 
Could relational autonomy conception be justified in Bangladesh context? In order 
to answer this question we may consider some important factors: firstly, although 
all patients are not poor and illiterate in Bangladesh the reality is that most of them 
are plagued by poverty and illiteracy. The patients are helpless, not being able to 
bear their medical expenses. When they become ill they have to face many problems 
such as inadequate medicine, overdependence on the physician for lacking the 
ability to read or write, scarcity of beds in the hospital, as a whole they become ill 
not only physically but also psychologically. All these things can be seen as a great 
obstacle to making autonomous decisions in a true sense. How can we imagine that 
such a patient being isolated will understand the meaning of disclosure, treatment 
procedure, will show a standard degree of competence, deliberation and decision 
making ability, and that their decision will be voluntary? Secondly, the patients 
are embedded within culture and family. It is a brute fact that many poor patients 
laying on the floor of the hospital, not getting enough care, recover disease partially 
for receiving very sympathetic, responsible, loving-care from the family members. 
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They serve the patient by providing invaluable labour, care, and support in making 
decision. Therefore, the patients might not be interested to isolate themselves from 
the family and to make decisions alone. Thirdly, the patients really expect sympathy 
and care even though they receive insufficient treatment. Fourth, the patients want 
to see the physician as the most trustful, sympathetic person; the only one who 
can treat, inform and advise. In considering these factors with socio-cultural status 
relational autonomy conception can be justified for Bangladesh. 
6. Conclusion
To summarize, after discussing the importance and different conceptions of informed 
consent in the patient-physician relationship we hold that care ethics approach 
provides the most plausible conception which is achievable in Bangladesh context. We 
have argued that the relational conception of autonomy from care ethics perspective 
is more appropriate for the illiterate, poor patient of Bangladesh. If we incorporate 
relational autonomy concept rather than traditional individualistic autonomy this 
will be more pragmatic and applicable. Informed consent in this sense is a “natural 
outcome” of the patient-physician relationship which supports that patients’ illiteracy 
might not be a barrier for giving their consent. 
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Informirani pristanak i pacijenti u 
Bangladešu
SAŽETAK
Informirani pristanak ima ključnu ulogu u etičkom donošenju odluka u medicinskoj praksi. 
Izgleda kako je posljednjih godina informirani pristanak ključno pitanje u biomedicinskim 
raspravama. Dosada je predloženo nekoliko definicija informiranog pristanka. No, 
socioekonomski uvjeti različiti su u raznim zemljama. Mnoge su zemlje kulturološki 
različite, ali postoje i razlike u postotku pismenosti stanovništva, stoga objedinjeni koncept 
informiranog pristanka možda ne bi bio opravdan u svakom pojedinom kontekstu. U ovom 
se radu raspravlja o važnosti informiranog pristanka, različitim pogledima na informirani 
pristanak i ograničenjima koje donosi primjena samo jednog koncepta informiranog 
pristanka u svakom kontekstu. Argumentira se da je za zemlje u razvoju, poput Bangladeša, 
najprikladniji koncept informiranog pristanka onaj koji se temelji na etici skrbi. Zaključuje se 
da, iz perspektive etike skrbi, informirani pristanak može biti ‘prirodni ishod’ i da ne bi trebao 
biti prepreka u odnosu liječnika i bolesnika.
Ključne riječi: autonomija, etika skrbi, informirani pristanak, odnos liječnika i bolesnika, 
poštovanje, rizik.
